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This article provides an assessment of the enforcement of the law governing 
commercial kangaroo killing, focusing particularly upon inspectorial practices. 
Australia’s kangaroo industry is the largest commercial kill of land-based wildlife in 
the world. Professional shooters hunt kangaroos in rural and remote locations at night. 
Due to the remote and decentralised nature of the killing, the industry presents 
unique challenges to law enforcement agencies that are responsible for the 
enforcement of animal welfare standards. This article focuses upon the role that 
inspections have in detecting offences within the commercial kangaroo industry. It 
provides a comparative analysis across the states, highlighting key differences in terms 
of inspectorial practices and the resulting outcomes. A common theme across all of the 
jurisdictions is that none of the agencies responsible for enforcement regularly 
conduct inspections of shooters, making it impossible to ensure that these parties are 
complying with the National Code of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos 
and Wallabies. Recommendations for reform are offered, including stronger 
compliance policy, higher rates of inspection, increased resourcing and the 
introduction of alternative methods of inspection.	  
 
 
Think occasionally of the suffering of which you spare yourself the sight. 
(Albert Schweitzer) 
Introduction 
The kangaroo industry is the world’s largest commercial kill of land-based wildlife.1 During the last 
decade, 28 million kangaroos and wallabies2 were commercially killed with a ‘by catch’ of 
approximately 8 million joeys.3 The killing occurs in remote locations primarily in the states of 
Queensland, New South Wales, Western Australia and South Australia.4 The animals are wild and shot 
by professional shooters who generally operate on their own at night.5 Carcasses are brought in to a 
field chiller – a free-standing refrigerated building or, typically, a series of refrigerated re-furbished 
shipping containers – before being sold on.6 Professional shooters are expected to adhere to the 
National Code of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos and Wallabies (‘Code’),7 which is 
designed to provide welfare standards in kangaroo hunting both with respect to the target animal and 
                                                        
1  D Lunney, ‘A History of the Debate (1948-2009) on the Commercial Harvesting of Kangaroos, with Particular 
Reference to NSW and the Role of Gordon Grigg’ (2010) Australian Zoologist 384. 
2  Information about the total number of kangaroos commercially killed is available from Department of 
Sustainability, Water, Population and Communities, ‘ ‘Wild Harvest of Kangaroos and Wallabies’ Wildlife Trade 8 
April 2013 <http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/wildlife-trade/wild-harvest/index.html>. 
3  Based on R Hacker, S R McLeod, J P Druhan, B Tenhumberg, U Pradhan, 'Kangaroo Management Options in the 
Murray-Darling Basin' (Murray-Darling Basin Commission Canberra, 2004)), with a 60% male harvest (or 40% 
female), the number of young at foot killed annually in the last decade is around 300,000 and the number of 
pouch young around 840,000. 
4  There is also a small commercial industry in Tasmania. 
5  D A Thomsen and J Davies. ‘Rules, Norms and Strategies of Kangaroo Harvest (2007) 14(2) Australasian Journal 
of Environmental Management. 
6  South Australian Department of Environment and Heritage, The Kangaroo Conservation and Management Plan 
for South Australia 2008–2012 (appendix 2, 2008) <http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/wildlife-
trade/sources/management-plans/pubs/sa-kangaroo-08.pdf>. 
7  NSW Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water, Handbook for Kangaroo Harvesters (DECCW [now 
NSW Office of Environment and Heritage], 2010) 
<http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/nature/kmp/10160Hbkangharvesters.pdf>. 
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dependant young.8 As hunting activities take place over wide and remote areas, breaches of the Code 
are difficult to police and detect. Consequently, the regime primarily relies on self-regulation and 
periodic inspections by government agencies. The Code, in common with other model codes of 
conduct, is considered to provide minimum, though effective, animal welfare standards.9 Yet, 
reviewers have criticised the model codes for not being up-dated in a timely manner10 and for being 
developed in circumstances of conflict of interest.11 The latter, in particular, can foster regulatory 
weaknesses leading to lacklustre enforcement mechanisms.12  
The purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment of enforcement mechanisms of the Code, 
focusing on inspections for detecting breaches by industry participants. Not surprisingly, low levels of 
inspectorial activity bear a correlation with low rates of detection of offences. However, even with 
low inspection rates, the data reveals a preponderance of breaches relating to the method by which 
the animals are killed. As these breaches directly link to the animal welfare objectives of the Code, it 
calls into question the extent to which the objectives of the Code are being met. This paper argues 
that low-key enforcement methods, such as warnings and inspections are not operating to a 
sufficiently high standard, and this gap in the regime warrants greater government intervention. 
The Code is based on ‘smart and responsive’ regulatory models, including the regulatory pyramid 
developed by Ayres and Braithwaite.13 This pyramid recommends escalating penalties, commencing 
with low-key enforcement processes such as warnings and inspections, leaving prosecutions as a top 
tier, and last-resort mechanism. Although smart and responsive regulation is useful to foster 
compliance, failings in the operation of the commercial kangaroo industry dilute this positive 
influence. In particular, smart and responsive regulation has limits where a regime develops systemic 
failure.14 Although there is insufficient evidence to reach such a definitive conclusion with respect to 
animal welfare outcomes of the commercial kangaroo industry, the data discussed in this paper 
reveals a trend that warrants close monitoring of the industry. 
The discussion commences with a brief overview of smart and responsive regulation in order to 
provide context for the examination of the legal and regulatory framework that follows. In examining 
the regulatory framework, the discussion highlights the importance of inspections, not only as an 
enforcement mechanism but also as a means for governments and stakeholders to appraise the 
operation of the Code. The Code itself is voluntary and needs to be made operational within state-
based regimes. Some weaknesses in the Code stem from the way the Code is integrated into 
regulation at the state level; this regularly happens by incorporation into nature conservation 
legislation rather than animal protection legislation.15 The integration of this Code within the nature 
conservation legislation rather than animal protection legislation gives it a somewhat ambiguous 
status, particularly in relation to how the Code relates to animal cruelty offences.16 
In evaluating the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms, this paper concentrates on the 
inspectorial priorities of the relevant enforcement agencies. The research accesses available data on 
inspections to determine the number of inspections and offences detected in each state and, in 
particular, whether there are differences between the states. There are two steps to the 
methodology adopted: the first step was to locate and analyse the background material from journal 
                                                        
8  Code, s 2.4 and s 5. 
9 Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Australian Animal Welfare Strategy 
(DAFF, 2008) 9, 26, 27-9. 
10 Bruce Gemmell, ‘Review of the Australian Animal Welfare Strategy’ (Australian Government Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 2010), 28. 
11 Arnja Dale, ‘Animal Welfare Codes and Regulations, The Devil in Disguise’ in Peter Sankoff and Steven White 
(eds), Animal Law in Australasia: A New Dialogue (Federation Press, 2009) 174 and 185. 
12 Ibid. 
13 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University 
Press, 1992). 
14 Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (LSE, Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007, London School of Economics and Political Science Law Department) 11 <http://www.lse.ac.uk/ 
collections/law/wps/WPS15-2007BlackandBaldwin.pdf >. 
15 A limited number of studies have been undertaken on compliance within the commercial kangaroo industry. See 
RSPCA, ‘Australia, Kangaroo Shooting Code Compliance: A Survey of the Extent of Compliance with the 
Requirements of the Code of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos’ (Prepared for Environment 
Australia, July 2002) <http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/wildlife-trade/publications/kangaroo-
report/index.html> (‘RSPCA Australia Report 2002’); Dror Ben-Ami, ‘A Shot in the Dark: A Report on Kangaroo 
Harvesting’ (Prepared for Animal Liberation NSW, 2009). 
16 K Boom and D Ben-Ami, ‘Kangaroos at a Crossroads: Environmental Law and the Kangaroo Industry’ (2013) 30(pt 
2) Environmental and Planning Law Journal. 
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articles and published reports; the second step was to analyse the primary materials available, 
including the Code, state legislation, regulations, annual reports of government agencies and other 
materials.17 
Finally, the paper considers enforcement outcomes in the states, focusing upon penalty infringement 
notices, warning notices and compliance letters. These actions form the bulk of enforcement activity 
in relation to the kangaroo industry. In the context of smart and responsive regulation, these methods 
are regarded as low to mid-range ways of addressing compliance issues. The paper seeks to identify 
relationships between inspectorial practices and these mid-low level enforcement outcomes. The 
paper does not assess prosecutions or sentencing outcomes, which are beyond its scope. However, it 
assesses data collected by the regulatory agencies that indicates that compliance with the Code is 
uncertain. This calls into question whether self-regulation is succeeding and, if not, whether this 
warrants consideration of new approaches. 
Smart regulation and responsive regulation 
‘Smart regulation’ is a regulatory model18 that emphasises designing regulatory responses that take 
into account the needs, views and motivations of stakeholders against the backdrop of the ‘cultural, 
economic, and institutional’ environment of the regulatory regime.19 The smart regulatory model 
incorporates five principles that include using the optimum mix of instruments and institutional 
combinations:20 the use of ‘less interventionist measures’; 21 a pyramid of enforcement starting from 
persuasions and warnings through to sanctions such as civil and criminal penalties and loss of licence; 
systems that are also the essence of responsive regulation;22 and harnessing the power of other 
parties, such as industry associations and pressure groups.23 
‘Responsive regulation’ utilises a prudent mix of compliance and deterrence and differs from smart 
regulation because it focuses more on the conduct of the regulated parties and less on a mix of 
regulatory mechanisms that may be suitable to the regulated.24 In accordance with responsive 
regulation, governments entrust stakeholders with much of the operation of regimes,25 and it is 
incumbent on government to negotiate and settle regulatory responses with ‘the regulated’.26 
The regulatory pyramid is an enforcement mechanism common to both systems that proffers a broad 
base of soft measures such as education and warning letters, middle-range measures that include 
inspections and higher-range measures based on penalties including suspension of licences.27 Although 
the pyramid offers a range of measures, the recommendation is that regulators start at the base 
rather than the top or middle of the pyramid except in exceptional or life-threatening 
circumstances.28 Once regulators have tried low-key approaches, the more ‘coercive control comes to 
be seen as more legitimate’.29 
Although smart regulation and responsive regulation differ, they share similarities that juxtapose 
them against command and control systems. The latter creates regimes that comprise rules and 
regulations determined by government with little input from stakeholders.30 Consequently, command 
                                                        
17 Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (Lawbook Co, 3rd edition, 2010) 35. See also P Ziegler, ‘A 
General Theory of Law as a Paradigm for Legal Research’ (1988) 51(September) The Modern Law Review 569. 
18 Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
19 John S F Wright and Brian Head, ‘Reconsidering Regulation and Governance Theory: A Learning Approach’, 
(2009) 33(2) Law and Policy 202. 
20 Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, ‘Designing Smart Regulation’, in Bridget Hutter (ed), A Reader in 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 1999) 305, 309. 
21 Ibid 309-10. 
22 Ibid 311-19.  
23 Ibid 319-32; John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2002) 30. 
24 John S F Wright and Brian Head, ‘Reconsidering Regulation and Governance Theory: A Learning Approach’ (2009) 
33(2) Law and Policy 202. 
25 Ayers and J Braithwaite, above n 13, 4; John S F Wright and Brian Head, ‘Reconsidering Regulation and 
Governance Theory: A Learning Approach’, (2009) 33(2) Law and Policy, 197 at 198. 
26 John S F Wright and Brian Head, ‘Reconsidering Regulation and Governance Theory: A Learning Approach’, 
(2009) 33(2) Law and Policy 198.  
27 John Braithwaite, ‘The Essence of Responsive Regulation’, (2011) 44 UBC law Review 476, 480. 
28 Ibid 482. 
29 Ibid 486. 
30 Wright and Head, above n 26. 
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and control mechanisms have been described as ‘inflexible and inefficient’.31 They do, however, 
provide uniform and consistent regulatory responses.32 
At the same time, the effectiveness of smart and responsive regulation has limits. For example, the 
regulatory pyramid focuses on escalation of penalties, yet, in some circumstances, different 
responses may be more appropriate. These can include investigating systemic issues such as the 
operation of an industry or exploring the possibility of tightening entry to an industry by increasing 
licensing requirements.33 Other critiques of smart and responsive models focus on the fact that the 
models ‘come into play only after substantive policy goals have been articulated’.34 Thus, the models 
build on existing frameworks rather than determining what those frameworks should be. If an industry 
or stakeholder sector is powerful or politically influential, it may obstruct development and reform of 
policy and regulation.35 Moreover, although, as a rule, threats and deterrents should be used 
sparingly,36 advice found in the literature also advocates using the ‘big stick’ approach. In these 
cases, responsive and smart regulation is reinforced by sufficient command and control measures to 
enhance enforcement of regimes and act as a deterrent: 
‘Speak softly and carry a big stick’ is an appropriate aphorism for today’s environmental regulator, 
but to be effective there must be certainty that the big stick can and will be used and the how, 
why and where of its use. It is the anticipation of enforcement action that confers the ability to 
deter.37 
Braithwaite notes the ‘big stick’ is important in cases of ‘system capacity overload’ where offenders 
realise that the likelihood of their being punished is low. In these cases, the fact that the regulator 
can step in with serious punishments will more likely lead to offenders forming their own compliance 
plans, which should lead to enhanced compliance.38 
The enforcement mechanisms of the Code are consistent with the regulatory pyramid model that 
provides a range of processes, including inspections, penalties, loss of licence and prosecutions that 
are part of the regulatory framework for the commercial kangaroo industry. However, this does not 
automatically mean that the regime is meeting its stated objectives. 
Legal and regulatory framework 
The objectives of the Code are clearly set out in terms of animal welfare: 
This Code has been produced to ensure that all persons intending to shoot free-living kangaroos or 
wallabies for commercial purposes undertake the shooting so that the animal is killed in a way that 
minimises pain and suffering.39 
The way that the Code achieves this objective is by detailing how shooters accomplish rapid death of 
the target animals.40 To start with, shooters should aim for the brain of the target animal,41 as this 
results in a quick, and comparatively painless death. Shooters should also avoid shooting female 
kangaroos where it is obvious that they have pouch young or dependent young at foot except in 
special circumstances.42 In addition, if a female is shot, then her dependent young must be killed as 
well. Methods for killing the young vary in accordance with their age, but include decapitation and 
                                                        
31 Gunningham and Sinclair, above n 20, 308. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (LSE, Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007, London School of Economics and Political Science Law Department) 11 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS15-2007BlackandBaldwin.pdf>. 
34 Wright and Head, above n 26. 
35 Ibid 211. 
36 Braithwaite, above n 27, 505. 
37 Rob White and Diane Heckenberg, ‘Legislation, Regulatory Models And Approaches To Compliance and 
Enforcement (Briefing paper 6 (quoting Robinson) ARC Discovery Grant, School of Sociology and Social Work, 
University of Tasmania, July 2012) 19 <http://www.utas.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/278007/ 
Briefing_Paper_6_-_Laws_Regulation_Enforcement.pdf>. 
38 Braithwaite, above n 27, 486. 
39 Code, s 1.1. 
40 Ibid s 2.4. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid 
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the use of a blow to the base of the skull.43 The Code also contains further directives that deal with 
the type of ammunition to be used and follow-up procedures on multiple kills.44 
The Code itself is not enforceable, which means that it is the responsibility of the states to make the 
Code operational. However, because the states vary in their approaches, the Code’s enforceability 
and integration into each state’s legal framework varies (Table 1). In particular, the Code does not 
permit the use and sale of carcasses that are not killed in accordance with its provisions, which 
means the states have some discretion in determining which carcasses will be regarded as Code-
compliant and which will not be Code-compliant. This also means that the states can vary in their 
regulation across the kangaroo industry supply chain. 
Table 1: Enforceability of the Code into State Legislation 
State Codes Specification Penalties 
QLD 
Section 10 of the Nature 
Conservation (Macropod 
Harvesting) Conservation 
Plan) 2005 (QLD) 
Licensed commercial shooters must only 
take a macropod in a way specified in 
the Code. 
The maximum penalty for a 
breach of section 10 is 165 
penalty units, which equates to 
$16,500. 
Section 17 provides that licence 
holders (ie processors and 
dealers) must not accept a 
dead macropod taken in 
contravention of the Plan. 
Again, the maximum penalty is 
165 penalty units. Shooters in 
QLD must comply with the Code 
and must not sell carcasses that 
have a bullet wound in the 
body. 
 Section 11 of the Nature 
Conservation (Macropod 
Harvesting) Conservation 
Plan) 2005 
A harvest period notice may impose 
additional conditions with which the 
licence holder must comply. 
The maximum penalty is 165 
penalty units. 
 
Section 7 of the Nature 
Conservation (Macropod 
Harvest Period Notice 
2012) Notice 2011 (QLD) 
The carcass or skin of a macropod taken 
under a shooters licence during the 
harvest period must not be sold or given 
away during the period if the macropod’s 
body has a bullet wound.45 
 
NSW Section 133(2) of the 
National Parks and 
Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) 
The Director-General may attach any 
conditions or restrictions to a licence 
upon its issue. 
 
 
Section 133(3) 
The Director-General may attach any 
conditions or restrictions to the licence 
after its issue; vary or remove any 
conditions or restrictions attached to the 
licence; or otherwise vary the licence. 
 
 Condition 4 of the Current 
Conditions on Commercial 
Fauna Harvester 
Licences46 
Licence holders must only harm 
kangaroos in accordance with the Code. 
 
 Condition 15 of the 
Current Conditions on 
Commercial Fauna 
Harvester Licences47 
The licensee must not possess or sell any 
kangaroo carcass containing a bullet 
wound in the body. 
 
 Section 133(4) of the 
National Parks and 
Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) 
A licence holder shall not contravene or 
fail to comply with any condition or 
restriction attached to the licence. 
The maximum penalty for 
individuals is 100 penalty units 
which equates to $11,000 and if 
the offence is a continuing one 
                                                        
43 Ibid s 5. 
44 Ibid s 2.4. 
45 Section 7(2) provides that in this section body means a part of the macropod’s body other than its head. See also 
Nature Conservation (Macropod Harvest Period Notice 2010) Notice 2009, s 8.  
46 NSW Government, NSW Handbook for Kangaroo Harvesters 
<http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/nature/kmp/10160Hbkangharvesters.pdf>. 
47 Ibid. 
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State Codes Specification Penalties 
a further 10 penalty units 
applies for each day that the 
offence continues.48 
SA 
Regulation 22 of the 
National Parks and 
Wildlife (Kangaroo 
Harvesting) Regulations 
2003 (SA) 
Permit holders must not sell or supply a 
kangaroo carcass unless (a) the kangaroo 
was taken in accordance with the Code; 
and (b) the kangaroo has not suffered 
damage from a firearm other than 
damage to the head or damage to the 
head and such damage as results from a 
single shot to the heart. 
The maximum penalty is $1000. 
WA 
Regulation 6(3) of the 
Wildlife Conservation 
Regulations 1970 (WA) 
Licences to take kangaroos for sale are 
subject to any condition endorsed on the 
licence and to the succeeding provisions 
of the regulation 
 
 Condition 1 of the Licence 
to Take Kangaroos for 
Sale49 
All shooting is to be carried out in 
accordance with the Code. 
 
 
Condition 2 of the Licence 
to Take Kangaroos for Sale 
Only kangaroos that have been killed by 
a single shot to the brain shall be 
delivered to a licensed kangaroo 
processor. 
 
 
Condition 2 of the Licence 
to Process 
The licensee shall only accept the 
carcasses of kangaroos that were killed 
by a single shot to the brain. 
 
 
Condition 4 of the Licence 
to Deal in Skins 
The licensee shall only accept the skins 
of kangaroos that were killed by a single 
shot to the brain. 
 
 
Section 26 of the Wildlife 
Conservation Act 1950 
(WA) 
Any person who contravenes or who fails 
to comply with provisions of the Act or 
the regulations is guilty of an offence 
against the Act and is liable. 
If no other penalty is 
prescribed, to a maximum 
penalty of $4000 for a 
contravention or failure to 
comply with any provisions of 
the Act and $2000 for any 
contravention or failure to 
comply with any provision of a 
regulation. 
 
 
Any licence issued pursuant to the 
provisions of the Act and held by the 
licensee may be cancelled. 
 
 
In Queensland (QLD), for example, the 2005 Nature Conservation (Macropod Harvesting) Conservation 
Plan makes the method of harvesting macropods and the use of carcasses clearly enforceable in 
accordance with the Code.50 The position with respect to the sale of carcasses is less clear under New 
South Wales (NSW) laws. The NSW Director-General of National Parks can impose conditions on 
commercial fauna harvesting51 yet there are no conditions on processors to ensure that carcasses 
comply with the Code.52 Similarly, in South Australia (SA), while regulations apply to shooters,53 no 
conditions are placed on dealers or processors to reject carcasses shot other than in accordance with 
the Code. In Western Australia (WA), legislation and regulations do not contain any specific provisions 
                                                        
48 In the case of a corporation, the maximum penalty is 200 penalty units and 20 penalty units for each day that a 
continuing offence continues. 
49 Department of Environment and Conservation, Management Plan for the Commercial Harvest of Kangaroos in 
Western Australia 2008-2012 (October 2007). 
50 Nature Conservation (Macropod Harvesting) Conservation Plan) 2005 (QLD),  sections 7 and 10. Sections 111 and 
112 of the Nature Conservation Act, (Qld) indicates that conservation and management plans have the direct 
force of legislation. 
51 National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW), sections 133(2) and (3);Conditions 4 and 15 of the Current 
Conditions on Commercial Fauna Harvester Licences. Latter available from NSW Government, NSW Handbook for 
Kangaroo Harvesters 
<http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/nature/kmp/10160Hbkangharvesters.pdf>. 
52 Conditions are placed upon licensed chillers and occupiers, but not processors. See Condition 1 on Commercial 
Fauna Harvester’s Licence; Condition 5 on Commercial Occupier’s Licence. 
53 National Parks and Wildlife (Kangaroo Harvesting) Regulations 2003 (SA), reg 22. 
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related to the Code although regulation 6(3) of the Wildlife Conservation Regulations 1970 (WA) 
stipulates that licences to take kangaroos for sale are subject to any condition endorsed on the 
licence and to the succeeding provisions of the regulation. However, there are no specific provisions 
that create offences for failure to comply with the licence. At most, the licence can be cancelled in 
accordance with section 26 of the Wildlife Conservation Act 1950 (WA). 
As already noted, the Code is designed to regulate animal welfare within the kangaroo commercial 
industry based on smart and responsive regulation that is stakeholder-led. Accordingly, the provisions 
of the Code have been developed with input from stakeholders; the enforcement mechanisms follow 
the tenor of regulatory pyramid model; and the Code itself is voluntary, although it is integrated into 
state regulation by a variety of means. Given that commercial kangaroo hunting occurs in a range of 
locations, it is not feasible for governments to provide inspectors at the point of kill. The Code thus 
focuses on the conduct of hunters and stakeholders in the supply chain, relying on their compliance. 
Yet the inconsistent implementation of the Code at the state legislative level, as well as across the 
supply chain, raises issues directly related to the enforceability of the Code and the efficacy of the 
regime that oversees the commercial kangaroo industry. Two issues are particularly significant: first, 
identification of enforcement agencies and an understanding of their role; and, second, the extent of 
compliance with the provisions of the Code. 
Enforcement and compliance  
The regulatory pyramid places inspections at the mid-range level, and accepted practice is to start 
from a lower level, with less coercive measures, such as education and warning letters. However, 
inspections are an important component of the commercial kangaroo industry as they not only 
operate at an enforcement level, but also assist with identifying whether the regime is meeting the 
animal welfare objectives of the Code. Accordingly, if inspections are not carried out properly, or 
indeed not carried out at all, it means that regulators cannot say with certainty whether the Code is 
operating as intended; and, if not, whether this indicates systemic failure or other flaws warranting 
greater government intervention. The methodology adopted for the research of the next sections of 
this paper involved obtaining the annual reports of the various state regulatory bodies, some of which 
were already publicly available. The statistics available in these reports were compiled and analysed 
individually and comparatively. 
Enforcement agencies 
Responsibility for enforcement of the relevant laws in relation to the commercial kangaroo industry 
rests primarily with state government agencies, including:  
• The Macropod Management Unit of the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
(DEHP) in QLD;54  
• The Kangaroo Management Program of the Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH) in NSW;55 
• The Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) in Western Australia;56 and  
• The Department for Environment, Water and Natural Resources (DEWNR) in SA.57 
• Other bodies involved in enforcement including national parks, police and food safety 
agencies/departments. 
These agencies/departments have multiple interests, including operating a kangaroo management 
program and ensuring the welfare of kangaroos. The ability and resolve of these agencies to inspect, 
charge and prosecute offenders may be impeded by conflicts of interest, and much of the focus is 
upon promoting industry compliance with the Code. It is generally difficult to assess the full impact of 
this conflict of interest, but one result is the development of a reactive regime that largely focuses 
                                                        
54 Queensland Commercial Macropod Management Program, Annual Report 2011 (‘QLD Annual Report 2011’), 20. 
55 NSW Government, ‘2010 Annual Report’ New South Wales Commercial Kangaroo Harvest Management Plan 2007-
2011 (‘NSW Annual Report 2010’), 16. 
56 Department of Environment and Conservation, ‘The Commercial Kangaroo Industry in Western Australia: 
Compliance with Performance Measures Detailed in the Red Kangaroo (Macropus rufus) Management Plan for 
Western Australia 2003-2007 and Western Grey Kangaroo (Macropus fuliginosus) Management Plan for Western 
Australia 2003-2007’ (March 2007) 6. 
57 The Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources (DEWNR) was created on 1 July 2012 by 
amalgamating the Department for Water and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. See 
<http://www.environment.sa.gov.au/About_Us>. 
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on the ‘worst cases’ without sufficient attention to smaller, more institutionalised wrongful 
behaviour.58 In order for the Code to be implemented effectively it requires inspections to determine 
compliance levels, accompanied by adaptive management processes that are established in a timely 
manner. 
Inspections 
Unless otherwise stated, all references to inspection statistics in this section refer to state 
government annual reports. In QLD, Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (DEHP), 
formely known as DERM, conducts inspections of the commercial kangaroo industry with a number of 
priorities, including ensuring that non-head-shot macropods are not traded and that persons comply 
with the Code.59 Inspectorial data is available for dealer site and processing plan inspections in QLD in 
2009,60 201061 and 201162 (see Tables 2 and 3). In the last quarter of 2009, DEHP undertook an 
internal review and decided to inspect at least one per cent of total carcasses in 2010.63 DEHP also 
introduced a target to conduct a detailed inspection of at least ten per cent of the carcasses 
inspected.64 The same targets were used in 2011.65 In both 2010 and 2011 DEHP exceeded its targets 
for inspections (8306 and 10,133 respectively) and detailed inspections (2290 and 1793 respectively). 
In NSW, between 2006 to 2011, the Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH) conducted regular 
inspections of chillers for a number of possible compliance breaches, including non-head shot 
kangaroos (Table 2).66 Shooters’ vehicles were inspected for possible compliance breaches, none of 
which concern the Code (Table 2).67 OEH claims that inspections were carried out ‘continuously’ but 
also discloses that inspections of shooters’ vehicles occur ‘opportunistically’.68 Such inspections 
mainly occurred when chillers were inspected in the early morning because this generally coincided 
with deliveries by shooters. OEH did not disclose the number of shooters’ vehicles inspected. 
The kangaroo management plan for SA (available records from 2008–2011) sets performance measures 
for inspectorial activities. These measures include inspecting each chiller at least once a year; 
inspecting medium-high volume chillers are least twice per year; and inspecting each processor at 
least four times a year (Table 2).69 Priorities for compliance activities are set each year and the 
program is ‘reactive to change’.70 In 2011, the Department of Environment, Water and Natural 
Resources (DEWNR) priorities were to further develop its reporting relationship with the Meat Hygiene 
Unit, AQIS and SA kangaroo meat processors; and to determine compliance regarding carcasses with 
bullet wounds to the body through an audit of skin tanners to view samples of skins from SA, NSW and 
                                                        
58 Ibid; See Magistrate Wallace in Animal Welfare Authority v Keith William Simpson (unreported, Darwin 
Magistrates Court, Magistrate Wallace, 4 September 2008), ‘in all likelihood other shippers from Queensland and 
New South Wales have been in the practice of doing the same things, taking the same sort of risks and 
everyone’s got away with it’; as cited in Deborah Cao, Animal Law in Australia and New Zealand (Lawbook C, 
2010) para 7.470. See also Department of Local Government and Regional Development v Gregory Keith Dawson 
(unreported, Fremantle Magistrates Court, Magistrate Musk, 22 July 2008), 65 (the Prosecution submitted that 
‘these sorts of offences are not easily detected, particularly given the vastness of WA livestock are not generally 
in the public eye.’). 
59 QLD Annual Report 2011, 20; Queensland Commercial Macropod Management Program, Annual Report 2010 
(‘QLD Annual Report 2010’), 22. Other priorities include: macropods are correctly tagged with 2011 harvest 
period tag; macropods are tagged with the correct species tag; macropods are tagged with the correct zone tag; 
shooters produce/carry valid written landholder consent as per licence conditions; and ensure timely, complete 
and accurate harvest returns from dealers. 
60 Queensland Commercial Macropod Management Program, Annual Report 2009 (‘QLD Annual Report 2009’) 20. 
61 QLD Annual Report 2010, above n 60, 22. 
62 QLD Annual Report 2011, above n 55, 20. 
63 Qld Annual Report 2010, above n 60, 22. 
64 Ibid, 23. The phrase ‘detailed inspections’ is not defined. 
65 QLD Annual Report 2011, above n 55, 20. 
66 Office of Environment and Heritage, New South Wales Commercial Kangaroo Harvest Management Plan 2007-
2011: 2011 Annual Report (‘NSW Annual Report 2011’) 1, 5. Inspections are also carried out to detect the 
following possible compliance breaches: valid tags; correctly affixed tags; untagged kangaroos; display of 
premise registration number and licence number for either pet food or human consumption (NSW Food 
Authority); and the presence of other animal carcasses. 
67 Ibid 15. OEH inspects for the following possible compliance breaches: appropriate registration through NSW Food 
Authority (either for human consumption or pet food); correctly set up/fitted out (as per NSW Food Authority 
Memorandum of Understanding); untagged carcasses; and shooter carrying s 123 licence. 
68 Ibid 14. 
69 Department for Environment and Heritage, The Kangaroo Conservation and Management Plan for South Australia 
2008-2012 (‘SA KMP 2008-2012’), 31. 
70 Ibid 30. 
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QLD (Table 2).71 In 2011, DEWNR inspected chillers for a number of matters, including to ensure that 
kangaroos were shot in accordance with the Code.72 DEWNR inspects shooters’ vehicles and areas 
where shooters have operated on an opportunistic basis or as part of investigations.73 
Table 2: Dealer site, processing plant, chiller, tannery and shooter inspections (all states, 2003-2011) 
State 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
QLD          
Dealer site 
inspections 
- - - - - - 150 74 103 
Processing 
plant 
inspections 
- - - - - - 10 13 9 
Carcass 
inspections  
- - - - - - - 25,781 21,899 
Detailed 
carcass 
inspections 
- - - - - - - 2290 1793 
NSW - - - - - - -   
Dealer 
owned 
chillers 
- - - n/a n/a 205 227 143 138 
Shooter 
owned 
chillers 
- - - n/a n/a 23 19 7 10 
Chillers 
registered 
full year 
- - - n/a 109 138 172 125 132 
Chillers 
registered 
part year 
- - - n/a 107 90 74 25 6 
Chillers that 
did not 
operate 
- - - n/a 28 n/a n/a n/a - 
Total no. of 
chillers - - - 165 260 228 246 150 - 
Total no. of 
inspections - - -  788 1100  659 490 
No. of 
chillers 
inspected 5 
or more 
times 
- - - - - - 60 54 (= 
~36%) 
- 
SA - - - - - - - - - 
No. of 
chillers 
 - - - - 64 63 67 63 
No. of 
inspections 
- - - - - 45 93 92 55 
Mean no. of 
inspections 
per chiller 
- - - - - 0.70 1.48 1.37 0.87 
No. of 
processors 
- - - - - 6 6 5 5 
Number of 
inspections 
- - - - - 19 22 23 23 
Mean no. of 
inspections 
- - - - - 3.17 3.67 4.60 4.60 
                                                        
71 Ibid 10. 
72 Ibid 8. Chillers were also inspected for the following: sealed tags are correctly affixed; sealed tags are valid for 
use; correct colour sealed tag affixed to correct species; all kangaroos are presented in the correct form; and 
any meat hygiene issues are documented and reported. 
73 Ibid 30. 
T The role of inspections in the commercial kangaroo industry 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Occassional papers 2013 International Journal of Rural Law and Policy 
10 
State 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
No. of 
tanneries 
- - - - - 4 4 3 2 
No. of 
inspections - - - - - 8 8 8 2 
Mean no. of 
inspections 
- - - - - 2.00 2.00 2.67 1.00 
WA - - - - -     
Total no. of 
chillers ~420 ~420 ~420 ~500 504 ? ? 574  
Total no. of 
inspections 
?* ? ? ? ? ? ? 5  
Mean no. of 
inspections 
per chiller 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.0088 - 
Other 
information 
 
Every chiller 
in the eastern 
part of the 
Southern 
Zone and 
every chiller 
in the Central 
and Northern 
Zones from 
Geraldton to 
Port Hedland 
was inspected 
once. 
 
Every chiller 
in the 
western 
part of the 
Southern 
Zone and 
every chiller 
in the South 
West Zone 
were 
inspected 
once. 
- - - -  
Total no. of 
processors 
23 26 25 26 22 21 21 21  
Total no. of 
inspections 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 21  
Mean no. of 
inspections 
per 
processor 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.91  
Other 
information 
Each 
processor 
was 
inspected 
at least 
once per 
year. 
Each 
processor was 
inspected at 
least once 
per year. 
Each 
processor 
was 
inspected 
at least 
once per 
year. 
Each 
processor 
was 
inspected at 
least once 
per year. 
Each 
processor 
was 
inspected 
at least 
once per 
year. 
- - -  
Total no. of 
shooters 
308 314 407 404 339 417 ? 433  
Total no. of 
inspections ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0  
* ? Data is unavailable or unclear 
 
In 2008 and 2011, DEWNR did not meet its goal of inspecting each chiller at least once a year. In 
2008, at least 19 chillers were not inspected, and in 2011 at least eight chillers were not inspected. In 
addition, it is difficult to conceive how DEWNR would have met its goal of inspecting medium-high 
volume chillers at least twice during these years because this would result in additional chillers not 
being inspected. The target was not met in 2008 or 2009 when the mean number of inspections was 
less than four times. In 2010 and 2011, DEWNR met its target for inspecting processors at least four 
times a year. DEWNR has not disclosed the number of inspections conducted of shooters or the areas 
where shooters operate. 
The WA Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) has not disclosed its priorities for 
inspections of the commercial kangaroo industry in WA (Table 2). Data is limited for WA, with an 
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Annual Report available for 201074 and a Compliance Report available from 2007.75 These sources 
reveal that no chillers were inspected in WA during 2003, 2005 or 2007. There is no report of 
inspections of shooters’ vehicles. No statistics are available for 2008 or 2009. In 2010, DEC conducted 
inspections of processors and chillers but did not appear to inspect skin dealers or shooters.76 It is 
difficult to assess the data set for WA because of limited data availability and differences in reporting 
(the earlier data is limited to specific areas whereas the 2010 data is not). However, there is a 
summary of inspections conducted of chillers. The rate of inspections of processors in WA has fallen 
from 2003-2007 to 2010. In 2003-2007, every processor was inspected at least once; yet, in 2010, two 
processors were not inspected at all. 
Quality of inspections  
Enforcement agencies do not regularly inspect shooters to ensure compliance with the Code, 
particularly with respect to agencies in QLD and WA, which do not conduct any inspections of 
shooters. Although DEWNR (SA) and OEH (NSW) claim to inspect shooters on an opportunistic basis, 
these bodies do not report the number of inspections carried out. A further problem is that 
inspections of shooters in NSW do not relate to the conditions of the Code but instead relate to other 
matters. 
The general lack of inspections of shooters by the enforcement agencies means that these agencies 
cannot ensure that shooters are complying with the Code. Inspections of shooters are an essential 
precondition to ensure compliance and the detection of offences, particularly in relation to the killing 
of dependent young and injured kangaroos. This is already a major problem, as the RSPCA discovered 
in 2002 when their research identified that shooters have difficulty capturing and killing young at 
foot.77 As already discussed, the Code specifies the way in which young kangaroos need to be killed. 
In the light of the RSPCA report, it is significant that no training is required in methods for killing 
dependent young prior to the granting of a shooter’s licence, and that such killing occurs without any 
direct monitoring.78 From an animal welfare perspective, these two points raise critical matters 
regarding the supervision and enforcement of animal welfare perspectives in kangaroo shooting. This 
also gives rise to a wider issue regarding the role of monitoring, a process which is consistent with 
smart and responsive regulation. As Wright and Head have noted, monitoring can inform whether 
regulation, in this case the Code, is operating as intended, and whether more or less government 
intervention is required.79 
The available data reveals substantial variability across the states in relation to the inspection of 
chillers (Table 3). Inspection of chillers is important because it provides information on whether the 
kangaroos have been shot in accordance with the Code. In 2010, DEWNR (SA) conducted 92 
inspections of 67 chillers and OEH (NSW) conducted 659 inspections of 150 chillers. In contrast, DEC 
(WA) conducted just five inspections of 574 chillers. Thus, while chillers in SA and NSW were 
inspected at least once in that year (and in NSW much more), the majority of chillers in WA were not 
inspected at all. Therefore, chillers in WA are subject to substantially less inspectorial activity than 
similar enterprises in other states. This situation greatly increases the risk that offences in the 
commercial kangaroo industry will not be detected in WA. This risk is amplified by the fact that DEC 
did not inspect shooters during 2010. 
In 2010, DEWNR conducted 19 inspections of the six processors operating in SA (Table 3). In contrast, 
DEC (WA) conducted 21 inspections of 23 processors. Thus, the rate of inspections of processors was 
                                                        
74 Department of Environment and Conservation, 2010 Annual Report on the Commercial Harvest of Kangaroos in 
Western Australia (‘WA Annual Report 2010’).(March 2011). 
75 Department of Environment and Conservation, The Commercial Kangaroo Industry in Western Australia: 
Compliance with Performance Measures Detailed in the Red Kangaroo (Macropus rufus) Management Plan for 
Western Australia 2003-2007 and Western Grey Kangaroo (Macropus fuliginosus) Management Plan for Western 
Australia 2003-2007 (‘WA Compliance Report 2007’) (March 2007). 
76 WA Annual Report 2010, above n 75, 13. 
77 RSPCA Australia, ‘Kangaroo Shooting Code Compliance: A Survey of the Extent of Compliance with the 
Requirements of the Code of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos’ (‘RSPCA Australia Report 2002’) 
(Prepared for Environment Australia, July 2002) s 5.2 < http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/wildlife-
trade/publications/kangaroo-report/index.html>. 
78 For an analysis of the animal welfare outcomes of the Code, see Keely Boom and Dror Ben-Ami, ‘Shooting Our 
Wildlife: An Analysis of the Law and its Animal Welfare Outcomes for Kangaroos and Wallabies’ (2011) 5 
Australian Animal Protection Law Journal 44. 
79 Ayers and Braithwaite above n 13, 4; Wright and Head, above n 19, 198. 
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much lower in WA than in SA. This situation again creates a high risk of offences not being detected. 
The risk is further amplified by the fact that DEC did not inspect shooters and had a very low rate of 
inspections of chillers. A summary of the variation of inspectorial activities for shooters, chillers and 
processors across the states for 2010 is provided in Table 4. 
Only DERM (QLD) disclosed the total number of carcasses inspected. In 2010, 3.1 per cent of carcasses 
were inspected in QLD. Although this result exceeds DERM’s target, it also means that 96.9 per cent 
of carcasses were not inspected at all during that year. However, this disclosure provides an insight 
into the level of inspectorial activity and should be disclosed by the other states to aid analysis of 
enforcement. 
Enforcement outcomes and regulatory models: Penalty 
infringement notices, warning notices and compliance letters 
This part of the paper evaluates enforcement outcomes by examining infringement notices, warning 
notices and compliance letters in QLD, NSW, SA and WA. As already discussed, inspections which 
would ordinarily detect breaches of the Code are conducted at a low rate. Nevertheless, the data still 
reveals that substantial breaches stem from non-adherence to the welfare outcomes of the Code that 
focus on the method by which the animals are killed. 
In QLD, DERM issues Infringement Notices, compliance letters and warning notices. These forms of 
enforcement actions are used for ‘common breaches of the law where the impacts are not serious 
enough for court action’.80 The payment of an Infringement Notice does not result in the recording of 
a criminal conviction.81 Officers have discretion as to whether to serve an Infringement Notice but 
must take into account the intention of the statute to penalise breaches.82 DERM may also cancel or 
suspend licences given the meeting of certain conditions.83 DERM has issued compliance letters, 
warning notices and Infringement Notices to offenders in the commercial kangaroo industry Table 3. 
Table 3: Compliance letters, warning notices and infringement notices in QLD (2006-2011) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Compliance 
letters 
Shooter ? * ? ? 1246 2 0 
Dealer  ? ? ? 408 229 177 
Total ? ? 11 1654 231 177 
Warning notices 
Shooter ? ? ? 69 10 30 
Dealer ? ? ? 18 11 16 
Total 103 226 37 87 21 46 
Infringement 
notices 
Shooter ? ? ? 4 27 18 
Dealer ? ? ? 8 0 3 
Corporation ? ? ? n/a 1 n/a 
 Total 22 15 23 12 28 21 
TOTAL  125 241 71 1753 280 244 
* ? - denotes data that is unavailable or unclear 
 
The majority of breaches detected by DERM have related to reporting requirements. However, there 
have been some offences detected that relate to the Code (Table 11). In 2004, there was one ‘minor 
investigation’ of carcasses that were non-head shot but the outcome of this investigation was not 
disclosed.84 In 2007, there were two instances of ‘clear breaches of the code of practice with regard 
                                                        
80 Department of Environment and Resource Management, Enforcement Guidelines  (October 2010) 9 
<http://www.ehp.qld.gov.au/management/pdf/enforcement-guidelines.pdf>. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid 14. These conditions are: when the breach of licence conditions has had serious consequences to human 
health, environment or natural resources; continual minor breaches have occurred despite warning being given 
by DERM; and provision is made for the automatic cancellation of the licence (eg accumulation of demerit 
points). 
84 Environmental Protection Agency/Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service, Final Harvest Report for Commercially 
Taken Macropod in Queensland for 2004 (2004), 10. 
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to pouch young, investigated and dealt with by Infringement Notice’.85 This is the only report of such 
offences across any of the states.  
In 2010 there was an increase in the number of offences detected that related to the Code. In 2010, 
eight of the Infringement Notices were incidents of ‘body shot’ carcasses86 (Table 4). In 2011, there 
were ten Infringement Notices for the sale of carcasses with a body shot wound.87 As was discussed 
above, DERM decided to inspect at least one per cent of carcasses in 2010. It appears that this 
increased level of inspectorial activity resulted in a higher rate of detection of body shot offences. It 
is also telling, that from Tables 5 and 7 – which deal with infringement notices, and tables 10 and 11 – 
which deal with interstate investigations, cases relating to killing, other than in accordance with the 
Code, represent numerically the biggest proportion of offences and incidents listed. It is also 
significant that these offences and occurrences go to the core of the animal welfare objectives of the 
Code. These objectives are predicated on the humane killing of kangaroos and their young and the 
data set out below provides sufficient material that justifies further investigation into the 
effectiveness of this aspect of the Code. 
Table 4: Infringement notices in QLD(2008-2011) 
Offence 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Fail to comply with weight requirements in Harvest 
Period Notice 
4: Penalties of $300 each. ? - - 
Fail to ensure information in return is complete and 
accurate/legible/completed in ink 
2: Penalties of $300 each. ? - - 
Fail to give return for each period/by prescribed time 9: Penalties ranging from 
$300- $400 each. 
? - 2 
Fail to keep record/return book at prescribed place for 
prescribed time 
1: Penalties of $300 each. ? - - 
Fail to properly attach tag immediately after macropod 
is dressed 
3: Penalties of $300 each. ? 7 4 
Fail to record relevant particulars within prescribed 
period 
2: Penalties of $300 each. ? - - 
Relevant authority or identification not available for 
inspection 
1: Penalties of $150 each. ? - - 
Interfere with tag attached to wildlife without lawful 
authority 
1: Penalties of $225 each ? - - 
Wrong species tag - ? 8 1 
Body shot (or fail to comply with conditions of harvest 
period notice (sale of carcass with body shot wound)) 
- ? 8 10 
Failing to comply with licence conditions - ? 3 - 
Keep/use without lawful authority - ? 1 1 
Fail to comply with conditions of authority (incorrect 
harvest zone tag used) - ? - 2 
Buy or accept macropods tagged in contravention of 
Act - ? - 1 
TOTAL 
23 
$12,877.60 
23 28 21 
 
 
In 2008, DERM disclosed the types of offences detected that results in compliance letters or warning 
notices (Table 6). None of these directly related to the Code. 
OEH (NSW) issues Infringement Notices for minor, one-off breaches of criminal provisions and the 
payment of these fines does not result in the recording of a criminal conviction.88 The majority of 
offences detected in NSW relate to reporting requirements, but there are some offences that relate 
to the Code (Table 6). From 2008 to 2010 there were offences for non-head shot carcasses. Data on 
                                                        
85 Department of Environment, Heritage and The Arts, Wildlife Trade Management Plan for Export – Commercially 
Harvested Macropods (2007) [herein ‘QLD Annual Report 2007’], 9. 
86 QLD Annual Report 2010, above n 60, 22. 
87 QLD Annual Report 2011, above n 55, 21. 
88 Office of Environment and Heritage, OEH Prosecution Guidelines (February 2012) 11 
<http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/legislation/20120111OEHProsGuide.pdf>. 
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warning notices and compliance letters is not available except for 2010, when 26 warning notices 
were issued, and 2011, with 21 written cautions issued. 
Table 5: Compliance letters and warning notices by type of offence in QLD (2008) 
Offence Compliance letters Warning notices 
Fail to carry authority/properly endorsed authority/identification 
while in possession of tag 
- 1 
Fail to comply with weight requirements in Harvest Period Notice - 2 
Fail to ensure information in return is complete and 
accurate/legible/completed in ink 
8 2 
Fail to give return for each period/by prescribed time 3 16 
Fail to keep record/return book at prescribed place for prescribed 
time - 4 
Fail to properly attach tag immediately after Macropod is dressed - 2 
Fail to record relevant particulars within prescribed period - 4 
Relevant authority or identification not available for inspection - 6 
TOTAL 11 37 
 
Table 6: Infringement Notices in NSW (2008-2011) 
Offence 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Fail to submit 
returns 
Fail to submit returns (shooter) ?* 86 49 19 
Fail to submit returns (chiller) ? 3 1 - 
Fail to submit returns (fauna dealer) ? - 1 - 
Sub-Total 65 89 51 19 
Use unregistered chiller 1 - 3 - 
Exceed number authorised - 1 3 1 
Unauthorised species - 3 3 - 
Non-head shot 7 13 4 10 
Untagged carcasses 11 2 3 1 
Harvester returns not true and accurate - - 4 6 
Submit false information 2 4 - - 
Transfer tags 1 1 4 - 
Shoot outside licence period 1 - 5 2 
Fail to return unused tags - 1 - 8 
Harm protected fauna 1 4 - - 
Chiller registration numbers not displayed - - - - 
Underweight carcasses 1 - - - 
Possess protected fauna 1 - - - 
Sell protected fauna - - - 2 
TOTAL 91 118 82 49 
* ? - denotes data that is unavailable or unclear 
 
OEH also made a number of licence cancellations over this period. In 2008, the licences of seven 
shooters were cancelled.89 One of these cancellations related to a repeated failure to comply with 
licence conditions.90 In 2009, the licence of one shooter was cancelled due to repeated failure to 
comply with licence conditions.91 The shooter lodged an appeal with the Minister for the 
                                                        
89 Department of Environment and Climate Change, New South Wales Commercial Kangaroo Harvest Management 
Plan 2007-2011: 2008 Annual Report (‘NSW Annual Report 2008’) 16. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Department of Environment and Climate Change, New South Wales Commercial Kangaroo Harvest Management 
Plan 2007-2011 (‘NSW Annual Report 2009’), 18. 
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Environment, who decided to reinstate the licence.92 In 2010 and 2011 there were no licence 
cancellations.93 
Enforcement data is available for SA for the period 2007 to 2011. In 2008, there were five cautions 
issued for offences relating to the Code.94 In 2007, there were two offences for failing to comply with 
the Code.95 There were no similar offences in the other years (Table 7). 
Table 7: Cautions in SA (2007-2011) 
Offence 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Fail to comply with conditions of Authority - 1 9 1  
Permit holder to supply returns within 14 days - 24 5 6 3 
Import animal without Permit - - - - 1 
Tag must not be out of date - - - - 2 
Prohibition of carcass without tag - - 4 2 - 
Tag must be that for which land on which kangaroo is taken is 
nominated 
- - 2 1 - 
Must attach sealed tag immediately after taking kangaroo - 1 6 2 - 
May only take number permitted by permit - - - 1 - 
Unused sealed tag must be nominated for land - - - 1 - 
May only take from land to which permit applies - - - 1 - 
May only take species and number permitted by permit - - - 1 - 
Must not sell kangaroo carcass except in particular form - - 1 1 - 
Must record Schedule 2 info in Field Record Book - - - 4 - 
Permit holder only to sell if kangaroo taken pursuant to Code of 
Practice for humane shooting of kangaroos 
- 5 - - - 
Incorrect information supplied on returns - - 3 - - 
Must not take a kangaroo unless in possession of unused seal tag 
nominated for land 
- - 1 - - 
Unused sealed tag must be for nominated land - 3 - - - 
Commercial use tag must be correct colour - 1 - - - 
Permit holder must not contravene National Parks and Wildlife 
(Wildlife) Regulations 2001 
- 1 - - - 
Failure to specify chiller location 3 - - - - 
Failure to comply with Code of Practice for Humane Shooting of 
Kangaroos 
2 - - - - 
Failure to maintain accurate harvest records 2 - - - - 
TOTAL 7 35 31 21 6 
 
In 2008, there were five offences subject to penalties that related to the Code.96 In 2009, there was 
one such offence.97 There were no similar offences in the other years (Table 8). 
In 2008, there were no permit cancellations but one shooter was informed that his permit would not 
be renewed on 1 July 2008 and had court action pending.98 In 2009, there were no permit 
cancellations; however, two shooters were placed on probation on the basis that they had 
‘committed serious offences and were put on notice that any further offences may result in their 
licence being cancelled’.99 In 2010, there were no permit cancellations.100 In 2011, DEWNR cancelled 
                                                        
92 Ibid. 
93 NSW Annual Report 2011, above n 67, 16. 
94 Department for Environment and Heritage, South Australian Commercial Kangaroo Harvest Report for 2008: 
Annual Report (‘SA Annual Harvest Report 2008’], 12. 
95 Department for Environment and Heritage, 2007 Annual Kangaroo Harvest Report for South Australia (‘SA 
Annual Harvest Report 2007’), 1. 
96 SA Annual Harvest Report 2008, above n 95, 12. 
97 Department for Environment and Heritage, 2009 Commercial Kangaroo Harvest Report for South Australia (‘SA 
Annual Harvest Report 2009’), 8. 
98 SA Annual Harvest Report 2008, above n 95, 13. 
99 SA Annual Harvest Report 2009, above n  98, 9. 
100 Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 2010 Commercial Kangaroo Harvest Report for South 
Australia (‘SA Annual Harvest Report 2010’), 10. 
T The role of inspections in the commercial kangaroo industry 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Occassional papers 2013 International Journal of Rural Law and Policy 
16 
the permit of one shooter on the basis of ‘serious and on-going breaches of the Act’.101 The shooter 
subsequently undertook re-accreditation training and the permit was renewed with probationary 
conditions.102 
Table 8: Penalties in SA (2007-2011) 
Offence 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Fail to comply with conditions of Authority - - 
11 
$2,530 
3 
$720 
8 
$216 
Permit holder to supply returns within 14 
days 
3 
$160 each 
5 
$850 
5 
$520 
1 
$180 
2 
$420 
Prohibition of carcass without tag - - - 
2 
$360 - 
Tag must be that for which land on which 
kangaroo is taken is nominated 
1 
$160 - 
1 
$170 - - 
May only take from land to which permit 
applies 
2 
$160 each - - - - 
Permit holder only to sell if kangaroo taken 
pursuant to Code of Practice for humane 
shooting of kangaroos 
- 5 
$1050 
1 
$170 
- - 
Incorrect information supplied on returns - - 
1 
$170 
- - 
Commercial use tag must be correct colour - 
1 
$170  - - 
Prohibition of carcass without tag - - 
1 
$180 - - 
Method of attaching sealed tags to kangaroo 
when taken for commercial use 
- - 1 $170 - - 
Hunt without landowner’s written 
permission 
- 1 $170  - - 
Sealed tags to be attached when kangaroo 
for personal use 
- 1 $170 - - - 
Only permit holder may sell or use skin - 
1 
$170 - - - 
Sealed tag attached incorrectly 
1 
$480 (including 3 
breaches @ $160 each) 
- - - - 
Failure to comply with permit conditions 
1 
$440 
- - - - 
Failure to maintain accurate harvest records 
1 
$160 - - - - 
 
DEWNR detected a number of carcasses imported during 2009, 2010 and 2011 that had bullet wounds 
other than to the head or that were underweight. These carcasses came from NSW (Table 10) and 
QLD (Table 11). 
As in the other states, Penalty Infringement Notices are issued in WA for minor breaches and their 
payment does not result in the recording of a criminal conviction.103 DEC also has the power to cancel 
licences.104 DEC has not disclosed the total number of Penalty Infringement Notices issued. In 2003 to 
2007, DEC did not disclose whether any offences relating to the Code were detected. The lack of such 
disclosure makes it impossible to assess the types of offences detected in WA. DEC reported on the 
detection of offences in 2010 (Table 11) and reported that the total number of alleged offences for 
shooters was ‘Not Applicable’.105 It is not clear what this statement means and whether there were 
no offences detected or whether DEC did not consider that offences were applicable to shooters. This 
statement may reflect a lack of enforceability of the conditions placed upon shooter licences in WA 
(as was discussed earlier). In 2010, DEC did not issue any Penalty Infringement Notices. There were 11 
offences detected in 2010 for processors and zero for chillers. All of these offences were dealt with 
                                                        
101 Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 2011 Commercial Kangaroo Harvest Report for South 
Australia (‘SA Annual Harvest Report 2011’), 10. 
102 Ibid, 10. 
103 Department of Environment and Conservation, Enforcement and Prosecution Policy (May 2008) 
<http://www.dec.wa.gov.au/content/view/2991/2126/>. 
104 Ibid. 
105 WA Annual Report 2010, above n 75, 13. 
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by a caution notice.106 Ten of these concerned late monthly returns and one related to an untagged 
carcass.107 
Table 9: Interstate investigations involving carcasses imported from NSW to SA (2009-2011) 
 2009 2010 2011 
Bullet 
wounds 
other than 
to head 
12 
carcasses 
4 Penalties in 
relation to 8 
carcasses (total 
$1200.00) 
7 
carcasses 
1 Penalty ($300.00) 
26 
carcasses 
10 Penalty 
Infringement 
Notices (total 
$3000.00) 
No further 
action on 2 
matters 
No further action on 
2 carcass 
No further 
action in 
relation to 12 
carcasses 
Awaiting advice 
from NSW on 2 
matters 
Awaiting advice 
from NSW on 2 
matters and 3 
pending interview 
4 matters 
pending 
interview 
Underweight 
kangaroo 
carcasses 
6 
carcasses 
1 Penalty in 
relation to 2 
carcasses ($300) 
Cautions issued 
for 4 carcasses 
 - - - 
 
Table 10: Interstate investigations involving carcasses imported from QLS to SA (2009-2011) 
 2009 2010 2011 
Bullet 
wounds 
other than 
to the head 
3 
carcasses 
 
5 
carcasses 
3 Penalties in 
relation to 1 
carcass 
($300.00) 18 
carcasses 
9 Penalty 
Infringement 
Notices (total 
$4500.00) 
1 Caution 
No further 
action – ‘QLD 
legislation not 
in place’ 
No further 
action in 
relation to 1 
carcass 
No further action 
taken in relation to 
8 carcasses 
 
Table 11: Letters of warning/caution notices and Infringement Notices in WA (2003-2010) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Letters of 
warning/caution 
notices 
Shooters ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 
Processors ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 11 
Chillers ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 
Skin dealers ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 
Total 1 4 2 20 ? ? ? 11 
Infringement 
notices 
Shooter ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 
Dealer ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 
Corporation ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 
 Total ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 
TOTAL  1 4 2 20 ? ? ? 0 
 
QLD saw a large increase in the number of Infringement Notices relating to body shot carcasses in 
2010 and 2011 when no such offences were detected in 2008 or 2009. Although one conclusion that 
may be drawn is that no offences actually occurred in 2008 and 2009, the increase in detection 
coincided with improved targets that DERM had introduced for the inspection of carcasses. This 
indicates that increased inspections are very likely to lead to greater detection of body shot carcass 
offences. In an analogous manner, there is only one report of an offence detected relating to 
dependent young (QLD) and no reports of offences relating to the killing of injured kangaroos. These 
results are not surprising given that detection of these types of offences would require inspections at 
the point of kill, yet no enforcement agencies regularly carry out such inspections. 
                                                        
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
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A similar situation may be occurring in WA where no offences were detected for shooters (‘Not 
applicable’) or chillers. DEC conducts a very low rate of inspections of chillers which make the 
detection of offences difficult. Therefore, the statistics from WA that indicate a low level of 
offences, are likely to emanate from its low level of inspectorial activity that results in the detection 
of fewer or no offences. 
Conclusion 
Regulatory theory based on smart and responsive regulation advocates the use of low-key 
enforcement and compliance methods in preference to penalties and suspensions. This philosophy is 
premised on the understanding that when stakeholders are involved in the design and implementation 
of regimes they are more likely to comply. Accordingly, regulators should invoke top-tier regulation 
only when necessary. This paper shows the results of an analysis of regulatory structures and state 
inspection reports carried out to assess how well the various state regulatory regimes operate on the 
kangaroo industry. 
Overall, the legal and regulatory framework governing the killing of kangaroos could be improved to 
support more effective enforcement of the Code. In particular, the Code could be better integrated 
into state regulations to ensure that its provisions are enforceable in relation to all persons 
participating in the commercial kangaroo industry to the extent that these provisions are relevant. 
Furthermore, state departments charged with regulating the Code have multiple interests, including 
operating a kangaroo management program and ensuring the welfare of kangaroos. The ability and 
resolve of these agencies to inspect, charge and prosecute offenders may be impeded by conflicts of 
interest. 
In order for the Code to be implemented effectively, it requires inspections to determine compliance 
levels. It is telling that increased inspections of shooters by DEHP (QLD) resulted in greater detections 
of offences. In contrast, the WA regime is particularly laggard in the detection of offences. Although 
the shooter’s licences issued in WA are subject to conditions concerning the Code, the enforceability 
of these conditions is unclear. An extremely low rate of inspections of chillers (relative to other 
states) further exacerbates the matter, resulting in an inability to determine whether offences have 
occurred. It is clear that the laws and inspectorial practices of WA need to be reformed to align 
better with the standards set in other states. 
The lack of consistent and uniform inspections presents the most significant gap in the regulatory 
activity within the kangaroo industry. Ten years ago (and less) there were no regular inspections (at 
least not on record). Inspection implementation has improved in recent years but variability of 
inspections within and amongst states is high and there is a lack of regular inspections of shooters. 
Gunningham et al108 recognise the complexity involved in implementing Codes of Practice and note 
that highly interventionist approaches require substantial administrative resources, are generally less 
flexible and rate badly in terms of political acceptability. However, the Code may be operating 
under, what Braithewaite also describes as, ‘system capacity overload’.109 In such situations 
offenders realise that the likelihood of their being punished is low. Although soft approaches, such as 
compliance plans, can still be effective in these instances, the regulated need to be aware that the 
regulator will step in with more serious punishments. 110 
Command and control measures accompanied by enhanced methods of inspection can close the gap in 
regulatory activity. Top-tier regulatory responses, such as licence suspensions and revocations, should 
be applied in the worst cases, where the offender has been deliberately non-compliant or a repeat 
offender. Control measures such as minimum inspection rates can be included in the Code to ensure 
regular and uniform inspection rates. The inspection capability could be further enhanced by video 
surveillance mounted on shooters trucks – as has been suggested as a means to monitor the welfare of 
animals in the live export trade in overseas abattoirs111 – and a greater number of inspections of 
carcasses at chillers. 
                                                        
108 N Gunningham, ‘Assessing the role of voluntary environment management arrangements in agriculture’ (2007) 
6(3) International Journal of Agricultural Resources Governance and Ecology 296. 
109 Braithwaite, above n 27, 486. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Labor MPs Melissa Parke and Steve Georganas have both demanded video surveillance in overseas abattoirs in 
relation to the live export trade. Greens MP Cate Faehrmann recently announced a Greens Bill for mandatory 
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Welfare outcomes may also be improved by formulating the integration of the Code into state laws 
with more focus on its objective of animal welfare. The authors suggest a number of measures such as 
that the granting of shooting licenses should be conditional on improved training programmes for 
humane killing; there should be effective selection and elimination processes in place for the granting 
of licences; the Code should be enforceable, with an emphasis on maintaining welfare standards; and, 
finally, the Code’s ‘soft’ measures should be underpinned by sufficient penalties to foster 
compliance. 
The current regime comprises of a mix of smart/responsive regulation but is undermined by the low 
inspection rate and underpinned by a weak command and control base. Consequently, the Code lacks 
the ‘big stick’, that is so important to the responsive regulatory pyramid. Overall, the legal and 
regulatory framework governing the killing of kangaroos could be better integrated into state 
regulations to ensure that its provisions are enforceable in a consistent and equivalent manner. This 
remains a pressing issue that requires serious attention to ensure better welfare outcomes for 
Australia’s kangaroos that are killed for commercial purposes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
CCTV surveillance in NSW abattoirs to guarantee that incidents of unacceptable cruelty can be prevented or 
prosecuted in the future. 
